Lucullus Page 10

  Appian records that Lucullus had arrived in Asia with one legion from Rome, and that besides the two Fimbrian ones he found in Asia, he added two more for a total of 30,000 infantry and 1,600 cavalry.13 The king was rumoured to have as many as 300,000 in his force. Plutarch confirms the Appian figure of 30,000 foot soldiers, but assigns 2,500 horse to Lucullus’ army. Plutarch’s Lucullus sees the tremendous size of Mithridates’ force and decides wisely enough to delay an engagement (he is thus presented in marked contrast to the far less experienced, hasty Cotta). Delay and caution would become the hallmarks of Lucullus’ military strategy; wisdom and prudence would serve Lucullus well in his military engagements, but would also prove to be exactly the qualities that would lead to recrimination and condemnation when the war seemed to drag on for too long, and when first one king and then another seemed to be running either away or amok in the face of a dilatory Roman pursuer. Certainly when he arrived in Asia, the Roman had significantly less manpower on which to depend than his royal rival and Asian adversary.

  Celestial Omens

  What happens next in the Plutarchan narrative is of particular curiosity. Mithridates had a large army, but he apparently had no interest in risking anything against an enemy he already knew all too well – the capable Lucullus – and so had prearranged to receive help from his ally Sertorius. The Sertorian commander Marius had led a force overseas to support Mithridates, and the Sertorian rebels now planned to engage the main body of Lucullus’ force. At this critical juncture, some sort of meteorological phenomenon took place. Plutarch says that a large, flame-like body fell to earth between the two armies, shaped like a jar of wine, with a colour like molten silver. Whether it was a meteor or a figment of historical imagination, the point is that the two sides mutually decided to refrain from combat and drew apart, with Marius no doubt moving to support Mithridates’ force. The place was Otryae in Phrygia; the event was like so many other prodigies and omens in ancient history – signs from the heavens that no dutiful, respectful and indeed scrupulous Roman would fail to ignore. In the present circumstances, the sign from the gods may well have been interpreted as a warning against pursuing what would have constituted something of a civil war. The Romans were a highly superstitious lot, very much given over to the alleged significance of heavenly portents and celestial harbingers of doom. Whatever it was that seemed to fall from the sky on that fateful night, it would keep Lucullus and the Sertorians from meeting in battle. Omens and portents fill the pages of Roman military history. One might well wonder if the story of the omen was in part embellished and exaggerated to account for what was a perfectly reasonable reluctance to avoid a major engagement at this juncture. A meteor could also serve practical purposes.

  As we have seen, Mithridates may have had ten times the number of men Lucullus could muster. Plutarch reports that the Roman decided to take three captives from the enemy in sequence, and one by one to have them questioned as to the amount of provisions each man had in his tent, and the number of men with whom each one shared his store. By careful reckoning, Lucullus thus determined that Mithridates had about three or four days left before he would be in dire need of provisions. He thus decided that the wisest course of action was both to delay battle and to amass as great a supply of provisions as possible to feed his far smaller army. Lucullus was prepared for a long delay before he met his enemy, and he correctly gauged that the huge force of the king would not be able to stay in the area indefinitely without some means of support. The man who knew better than most how to provision an army properly and how to manage the logistical difficulties of supply and provisioning knew how to employ his knowledge and talents in the subversion of his enemy.

  Cyzicus was on the shoreward side of the island of Arctonnesus, the modern peninsula of Kapidag. Alexander the Great was thought by some to have been responsible for connecting it to the mainland. Mithridates assumed that he could destroy it with relative ease, and decided to set out after dinner on an especially tempestuous night – hoping, after all, to escape the notice of Lucullus.14 It did not take long for Lucullus to learn what his enemy was doing, and he moved at once to the pursuit, though being careful and prudent in refraining from falling on the rearguard of the king. Lucullus realized that the practicalities of supplies were once again a key factor; Mithridates could lay siege to Cyzicus, but both the nature of the geography of the place and the supply needs of the king’s massive army meant that the Romans could relatively easily launch a blockade of their own to keep Mithridates’ army from foraging and being resupplied. It was now and only now, Plutarch reports, that Lucullus announced to his men that victory was at hand, and that within a few days the Romans would win without the loss of any men.

  Some scholars have asked why Mithridates was so concerned with Cyzicus, especially when he no doubt was all too aware of his supply constraints. Strategic considerations may have outweighed all others here. There were provisions of food in the city, of course, though Mithridates could not have counted on the relatively small stores of Cyzicus to help for very long, given the sheer size of his force. Most scholars agree that Mithridates was intent on capturing as much land as possible, as quickly as possible – all the better for any possible bargaining later. The king needed to be cautious and even dilatory in facing Lucullus, and lightning fast in seizing as much ground as he could.

  For it is clear that Mithridates did not feel that he was in a position to force an attack on Lucullus, numerically superior forces notwithstanding – no doubt a sizeable number of the king’s men were no match for the Roman legionaries. The king simply had quantity and not quality. It is also clear that Lucullus was able throughout these early operations of the war to pitch his camp in favourable locations. Roman military scientists gave great consideration to the problem of where best to pitch a camp, and how best to fortify such a locale against the enemy, and Lucullus was well versed in such practical matters.

  Some of Lucullus’ luck in this engagement with the king came as a result of the mysterious machinations of Lucius Magius, a Roman agent to Mithridates who convinced the king that Lucullus’ Fimbrian legions were interested in defecting to the Pontic cause. We have no idea why Magius said this. There is no certain evidence that he assumed that the king would trust him, fail miserably in his endeavours, and then he would be able to defect to Lucullus.15 Our ancient evidence is scanty on the matter, and Magius may well have been playing both sides against each other. Whatever the rationale, Mithridates listened to Magius, and Lucullus was able to seize favourable ground.

  The siege of Cyzicus was another joint land and sea operation. Plutarch reports that Mithridates had ten camps of infantry assigned to the task, as well as ships ready to enforce a blockade. The citizens of Cyzicus were ready to stand firm and wait for relief from Lucullus – but they were tricked by the enemy, who insisted that the Roman camp they could see in the far distance was actually a force from Tigranes of Armenians and Medes who had come to assist Mithridates. Lucullus was aware of the desperate state of the town, and the psychological aspect of warfare. We are told that he sent a Roman soldier on a harrowing mission through enemy lines, complete with the use of a flotation device to cover some 7 miles by sea to bring news to Cyzicus that Lucullus was indeed on his way to relieve them.16 Plutarch records other similar anecdotes related to the attitude of the citizenry: notably, a boy who escaped from captivity arrived in town and laughed when he was asked where Lucullus was; he pointed out the Roman camp to them, thereby encouraging them with the hope of imminent help. A messenger from Archelaüs was also sent, though he was less readily believed (it is possible that this man was the same as the soldier on the makeshift raft).17

  Persephone’s Intervention

  The goddess Persephone is also said to have provided aid to the Roman side. Persephone was the daughter of Demeter, famous for her abduction by Hades and her status as the queen of the underworld. Her festival was at hand, and the people of Cyzicus were in such desperate straits that they lacked t
he black heifer proper to her sacrificial rites. They prepared nonetheless to carry out the liturgy for the goddess, and fashioned a black heifer as a sacrificial victim from dough. To their shock, the black heifer that had been raised for the dubious honour swam across the strait and presented itself for slaughter. The goddess confirmed the portent by appearing in a dream to a town official with the word that she was indeed at hand with both the victim and tidings of great joy regarding the fate of the city. Soon a mighty wind rose up, and the king’s siege engines were toppled by the force of the blasts. Great expense and effort were lost in a relatively short amount of time; it seemed as if the goddess herself had acted in support of the besieged city.

  The Persephone story is an even more dramatic version of the same kind of omen that was said to have kept apart the forces of Lucullus and Marius. It is certainly plausible that there was a storm that wreaked havoc on Mithridates’ siege engines, and the tale of the goddess could easily have been invented ex post facto in light of the festival and the timing of the fortuitous tempest. Persephone was a goddess associated with death as well as rebirth; she was an infernal deity, an underworld immortal whose omens were especially frightful. In any case, the king’s war machinery was apparently ruined.

  Appian provides the most detailed account of the king’s siege engines, and the most informative narrative of what led to the destruction of the machines.18 Mithridates is said to have had a tower some hundred cubits high, from which there arose another tower that could fire catapult shots, stones and missiles. Two quinquereme vessels in the strait supported yet another tower, complete with a bridge that could be used by would-be attackers. Rams and other devices only added to the mighty force. There was also a human dimension to the siege, as Mithridates is said to have had 3,000 prisoners from the town who were sent to the walls and made to argue in favour of a surrender. Appian notes that the general Pisistratus told them that unfortunately they were already lost to Cyzicus as prisoners, and must therefore accept their fate with courage and bravery.

  Four of Mithridates’ men are said to have used the ship bridge to try to assail the walls. The defenders were taken by surprise, but fortunately for them, Mithridates’ men were quite slow in following up on the attack, and the four front-line attackers were thrown over the wall. Burning pitch was hurled against the ships. Water and vinegar were used against the flames from the landward siege engines. Mithridates did manage to breach the wall with fire, but the heat of the conflagration was such that none of his men were in a hurry to rush through to invade the town, and by night the defenders were able to patch the wall successfully. This is the moment when the wind is said to have struck the siege engines.

  Appian tells the same Persephone story that may be found in Plutarch, with the added information that the king was warned by his men to abandon the siege in light of the sacred status of the locale. He proceeded instead to the construction of more walls and more tunnels to seek to breach the city’s defences. Appian reports that some of the king’s horses were weak from lack of food – a reminder of the problem of supplies for the huge army – and were fallen upon by Lucullus as they crossed the River Rhyndacus. Some 15,000 men were said to have been captured, along with 6,000 horses and a significant amount of baggage. If we can believe Sallust (who is cited by Plutarch here), it is possible that the taking of pack animals and cavalry equipment at the Rhyndacus marked the first time that two-humped camels were seen by the Romans; Lucullus may thus be said to have introduced the animal to the Republic.19 Plutarch is incredulous, thinking it likely that the Romans had seen the animal in previous engagements.

  Plutarch’s version of the military operation at the river, at any rate, is the most detailed extant account. Mithridates had decided to send away both cavalry and disabled soldiers, in the hope of reducing the supply burden on his main army. Lucullus learned of the king’s plan, and set out despite stormy weather with ten cohorts of infantry and a cavalry force. It was the winter of 73–72 BC, and snow was falling; some men were overcome by frostbite and the cold, and forced to be left behind. But the victory was so great that women from the nearby town of Apollonia are said to have come out to plunder the battlefield.

  Persephone was not the only goddess who was involved in the defence of Cyzicus. Plutarch relates that the goddess Athena – the pre-eminent battle goddess – appeared to the citizens of Ilium (i.e., Troy) in a dream, complete with a torn robe and perspiration on her body, and told them that she had just come from the defence of Cyzicus.20

  Famine and Plague

  The hungry horses of the king were but a symptom of the more systemic problem of hunger and want in Mithridates’ camp. Lucullus was playing a delaying game that was focused on depriving the monarch of supplies. Plutarch notes that the king’s generals were part of the problem, refusing to tell him just how bad the situation was (they may have been afraid for their jobs and lives if Mithridates decided that they were less than diligent stewards of his resources and affairs), but soon enough no deception or concealment could keep the problem from the king’s notice, especially given the reports of cannibalism that emerged from the army. Unburied corpses are said to have spread disease and plague among the soldiery.21 The king was incensed that a relatively minor locale was proving to be so difficult; sieges, after all, are notoriously tedious and difficult to manage, and in this case the army of Lucullus was a constant threat, always nearby and yet never willing to engage in force. Sallust reports that illnesses were also rampant on account of how the army was forced to resort to unaccustomed food (possibly herbs or grasses).22 If we can believe the evidence of the grammarian Servius, the plague during the siege of Cyzicus was described by Sallust in a memorable style that was of great influence on Virgil in his account of the cattle plague at Noricum in his poem the Georgics.23

  Memnon (chapter 28) says that Lucullus killed many thousands of the king’s men at Cyzicus, and captured 13,000. Famine is mentioned as but one of Mithridates’ myriad problems.24

  The winter of 73–72 BC was not an easy one for King Mithridates, and the series of setbacks after his victory at Chalcedon seem to have induced him to decide to retreat from the scene.25 The staggering losses at the Rhyndacus no doubt played a part in this decision, but the problem of supplying the army was the more systemic threat to his chances for victory. The people of Cyzicus could boast that they had survived one of the most massive sieges in ancient history, and they credited Lucullus as much as themselves with the achievement. And in fact the siege of Cyzicus represented a reversal of the normal pattern of siege warfare, as thanks to Lucullus, the besieger and not the besieged was afflicted with the pangs of hunger and want. Games were established in Cyzicus in honour of the Roman general, games that Appian says were still being celebrated in his day in Lucullus’ name.26

  Plutarch notes that Mithridates was interested in deterring Lucullus from pursuing him, and so he assigned his admiral, Aristonicus, the task of seeing to it that a diversion could be created on water. Mithridates had once before crossed the Aegean in the hopes of invading Greece; the hope now was that the threat of naval action against Roman interests in Greece and the islands would be sufficient to keep Lucullus busy and away from the king. The Aristonicus affair was mostly diversionary, but there was also the business of maintaining even a pretence of a threat against Greek waters, for Mithridates, we might well think, still entertained dreams and ambitions of threatening Europe.

  Granicus Redivivus

  Aristonicus was apparently carrying a sizeable sum of gold that was intended to serve as a bribe for Roman forces, but unfortunately for the king and his agent, he was betrayed to Lucullus and the money lost. Buoyed by this easy victory, Lucullus is said to have fallen on the generals of Mithridates who were busy extracting the land forces from the siege of Cyzicus. An engagement at the River Granicus resulted in the deaths of 20,000 of the king’s men and a huge number of prisoners. No doubt it occurred to Lucullus that his victory was achieved at the very same river tha
t had seen a mighty achievement of Alexander the Great against the Persian Empire in 334 BC – the first of the three major battles that the Macedonian king fought against Persia. Interestingly, Appian does not mention the Granicus engagement, but a similar loss of the king’s forces at the River Aesepus. The whole effort at extraction had become a fiasco that was costing the king dearly in both lives and supplies – not to mention his reputation and honour. Lucullus was winning victory after victory, and at relatively minor cost, yet the king, however, was as elusive as ever.

  A Venusian Dream

  Lucullus enjoyed a miniature triumph when he entered Cyzicus after the vanquishing of the king’s forces at the Granicus. From there he proceeded to the Troad and the Hellespont with the intention of building a naval force to complement his land army (he may have been interested in settling the naval issue once and for all, and in keeping Mithridates from entertaining any dreams of regaining a foothold in the Aegean). Plutarch relates that the goddess Aphrodite appeared to him in a dream, asking why the lion was asleep while the fawns were so near for the taking. At once Lucullus rose from sleep and informed his men of the vision; soon there were messengers from Ilium who reported that the king had thirteen ships that were making their way to the island of Lemnos.27 Lucullus moved at once to intercept the vessels, and he was successful in capturing them and killed their commander Isodorus. Lucullus knew that these units were sailing off in the hope of making a rendezvous with other elements of the king’s navy; he thus set off in pursuit of these additional vessels. It turned out that the Sertorian commander Marius was with these ships. They had decided to draw up the boats on land and fight from the decks. Lucullus was forced to resort to trying to land some of his units behind them; these were able to attack from the rear and to help secure another victory. Lucullus gave strict orders to his men to kill the man with ‘one eye’ – that is, the commander Marius. The Sertorian was taken among the captives, and Lucullus ensured that he was slain in the aftermath as if he was a disgraced prisoner – Plutarch notes that Lucullus was especially concerned that Marius pay the price for his disloyalty. More victories followed, with Lucullus amply proving his talents both on land and sea – indeed, he stands as one of the most versatile figures in Roman military history.28