Lucullus Page 13
Meanwhile, we may note that Appian records the obeisance of Machares, the son of Mithridates and ruler of the Bosporus, who sent Lucullus a golden crown (we are not told what Lucullus did with the luxurious item and symbol of regal power).58 The exact date of when this member of the royal family turned traitor to Mithridates is uncertain, but it may have occurred after the siege of Sinope. Sufficient attention soon had to be paid to the problem of the king’s survival in virtual exile in Armenia. Essentially, Lucullus had seen to the clearing of Pontus. The whole region was now under Roman control, and the king had been deprived of his kingdom – though not of his life. For Romans with a long memory, the survival of Mithridates was a mark of continuing peril. There were parallels to the situation of Hannibal and the threat that such a fierce enemy of Rome posed so long as he lived. The First Mithridatic War had ended inconclusively, and Lucullus was doubtless in no mood for the third to be concluded prematurely. Plutarch notes that when Machares sent the golden crown to Lucullus – he specifies that it was worth a thousand pieces of gold – then and only then did Lucullus consider the ‘first war’ to be finished. A second now loomed.59
For Lucullus’ word to Tigranes of Armenia was simple – Mithridates needed to be surrendered to Roman justice.60
Chapter 5
Armenia
An Emissary’s Mission
Once again we are not sure of the exact chronology, but we do know that Lucullus sent a member of his own family to Armenia to bring the commander’s demand to the Armenian royal court.1 Appius Clodius – Lucullus’ brother-in-law – was the emissary who came with word that could not have been surprising, though certainly it was unwelcome and discomfiting. Lucullus was demanding nothing less than the head of Mithridates, and Tigranes was thrust into the unenviable position of having to decide between war and peace with Rome. No doubt there were considerations other than the question of loyalty to Mithridates. The surrender of the king would make it clear that Armenia was little more than a puppet of Rome. Plutarch notes that the king’s guides led Clodius on a circuitous, slow route, no doubt deliberately seeking to delay the inevitable and to buy more time for Tigranes to decide on a course of action, and to prepare for it. A Syrian freedman of Clodius soon informed his lord of a more expeditious itinerary. While waiting for the king to rendezvous with him, Clodius is said to have spent his time telling the local princes and potentates that Lucullus would soon be on the scene, and that he was looking for friends and was willing to reward those who were willing to side with him. But, for the moment, the princes were of course to remain silent about the Roman overtures.
Appian relates that by the time Lucullus crossed the Euphrates on his way to Armenia in pursuit of Mithridates, the local rulers he encountered were in no hurry to die for Tigranes – let alone his father-in-law. Lucullus was in some sense the commander of an invading force, but he carefully ensured that his only demand was what was needed to provision his troops.2 He had two legions and 500 cavalry – and, above all, an abiding sense of mission. Plutarch assigns the figures of 12,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, with 6,000 left behind under Sornatius to guard Pontus. There was to be no hope of an invasion of Mithridates’ homeland while Lucullus was off after Tigranes and his father-in-law. And once again, throughout his operations, Lucullus was to cultivate a reputation for his kindly treatment of local populations, a useful enough strategy – even were he not to have the humane disposition that we may believe he sincerely had – but no help, ultimately, in dealing with the fickle favour of the Roman ruling class and people. For them, two kings were now in defiance of Rome, either actual or potential. Lucullus could hold out hope that Tigranes might cooperate with his demands, but no doubt he had no serious illusions about where the king’s loyalties were to be found.
Scholars have contested the behaviour of Lucullus in his diplomatic overtures to the Armenian king. It appears certain that Clodius did not leave a favourable impression on Tigranes; certainly the monarch’s answer was not what Lucullus wanted to hear. The Armenians would not surrender Mithridates, and if the Romans were in consequence to launch an attack, they would defend themselves against the aggressor’s invasion force. One can imagine that honour and reputation did play a role in Tigranes’ reluctance to give up his father-in-law, but one can also imagine that Lucullus rued the day that his relative by marriage had created this mess for him, even if he knew on an intellectual level that Clodius had failed where no one was likely to have succeeded.
Tigranes was no stranger to aggressive tendencies. He had occupied Seleucid Syria, a troubled Hellenistic kingdom that had seen rivalries and breakdowns of loyalty in the House of Antiochus. Tigranes would in fact be forced to abandon Syria in order to defend his own kingdom in the wake of the defeat of Mithridates and the war with Lucullus.3 He had expanded his kingdom into Parthia and Mesopotamia. He was also fond of importing citizens from abroad to populate his capital, Tigranocerta, and to try to make it a cosmopolitan centre of culture and renown. There is no reason to think that he much enjoyed the idea of sharing his backyard with a Roman occupation force, or with having his borders come up against those of a Roman province. There is, on the contrary, every reason to imagine that Tigranes was as imperialistic as his father-in-law, and that sooner or later he would have run foul of Roman interests in Asia. Lucullus had more experience by now in dealing with Asian kings than most men in the Roman Army; one can only speculate as to how others would have handled the current crisis in his situation. There is no reason to believe that Clodius deliberately tried to harm Lucullus’ cause at the court of Tigranes. The situation in Armenia could likely not have been resolved satisfactorily by any emissary to the king’s palace.4
Tigranes had been involved in a siege of Ptolemais-Ake (modern Acre in Israel) when Clodius first arrived in Antioch looking for him (and Mithridates). The hour of his great accomplishments against Hellenistic rivals was to be the commencement of his greatest crisis.5 He would have the chance to face Lucullus in a variety of circumstances and military engagements. In some regards he would prove simultaneously both as victorious and as unsuccessful as his royal father-in-law.
It is easy in hindsight to say that the refusal of Tigranes to hand over Mithridates at once gave an easy opening to the Roman equestrians to press their case against Lucullus on behalf of the publicani. Lucullus no doubt thought that he could master time and solve the renegade king problem before he faced insurmountable challenges on the domestic front. But time was to work against him in this regard. The kings certainly had an easier task ahead of them.
The Significance of Salutations
But the real question about Lucullus’ wisdom and diplomatic savoir faire at a critical moment comes from the question of salutations. It seems that the Roman addressed the Armenian with the title of ‘King’, while Tigranes styled himself ‘King of Kings’. In the arena of monarchical vanity, the question might certainly seem to be an important one. Tigranes was incensed at what he considered to be a slight to his dignity, and noted that in return he would not accord Lucullus the title of Imperator.6 Some have argued that Lucullus should have known better, and that the king’s offence was easily foreseeable. Others would say that Tigranes would have sought any pretext – however slight – to rebuff the Roman demand for Mithridates. Yes, one could say in response, but this does not mean that Lucullus should have handed the Armenian king his pretext. It may simply have been the case that Lucullus was already feeling quite impatient, and that he had little if any tolerance for the salutational demands of a king who was now the sole reason he was being frustrated in his hopes to end the Eastern wars.
Arthur Keaveney does well to note that Tigranes was the ruler of an impressively expansive domain. He had land holdings that stretched over an astonishingly vast tract of territory, though with the usual problems that accompanied the maintenance of such empires: problems of communications and language, and lack of effective centralized authority.7 Today, a statue of Tigranes II the Great stands in Yerev
an, the capital of the Republic of Armenia. He would end his career and life as an ally of Rome, surviving until 55 or 54 BC. In light of the question of whether he deserved to be considered a King of Kings, we may note that some scholars have concluded that the star with a curved tail on his crown in iconography may be a depiction of Halley’s Comet, which Tigranes could conceivably have seen in 87 BC. – and which he might well have taken to be an omen of his own magnificence and power. Tigranes has done well in the ‘reception’ he has enjoyed in the arts; there are several operas that are concerned with his story, including works by Scarlatti and Vivaldi. Armenians still speak of the vast empire that Tigranes controlled, a territory that at its height reached from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. ‘Tigran’ remains a popular Armenian name.8 In any case, Tigranes had a whirlwind experience of Roman conquest. He would suffer significant defeats in 69 and 68 BC against Lucullus, while in 66, he would finally surrender to Pompey.9 Ultimately, he would enjoy a better fate than that of his father-in-law. We do well to remember that if Tigranes was in an impossible position for the moment in terms of what to do with Mithridates, so too was Lucullus. He could not simply pick up his forces and return home with the king on the run. It would be Dardanus all over again, but after much greater expense and effort.
Eastern Kings
For the moment, however, the Armenian king was being wooed by Roman emissaries. Tigranes is said to have given Clodius an ample selection of presents as a mark of respect and homage for his embassy. Following the example of Lucullus, Clodius was willing to accept a single bowl so as not to appear to reject all overtures from the king and to shut down diplomatic avenues of rapprochement. But the rest of the gifts were sent back – there was a careful diplomatic dance to perform here, and the king was not to be given the impression that he had captivated his Roman visitor, or that Lucullus’ demand was somehow to be softened.
Plutarch does little to disguise his contempt for Tigranes’ reception of Clodius.10 He notes that it must have been a quarter of a century since Tigranes had heard so free a speech – for that was the length to date of his reign, or, more accurately, his hubristic attitude. Clodius, for his part, is said not to have been cowed by the king’s ostentatious displays of wealth and Eastern luxury. Tensions were already high between Roman and Armenian, and both men may have been all too well aware that a war was afoot, with Mithridates the prize.
It was perhaps inevitable that Tigranes and Mithridates would come to some sort of terms. If the Armenian king had determined to preserve Mithridates’ life even at the cost of war with Rome, it served no purpose to keep the king at arm’s length in virtual exile. At the very least, Mithridates might be useful to Tigranes in the matter of counsel and advice. And so the two monarchs began to hold meetings together in Tigranes’ palace, and Plutarch is clear that the peace between the men came at the price of their friendships with others. One Metrodorus of Scepsis had been sent as an emissary of Mithridates to Armenia with a request for aid against the Romans. When Tigranes had asked for Metrodorus’ personal advice on the matter, the ambassador had noted that in his capacity as Mithridates’ delegate, he urged that the Armenians send aid to Pontus. On the other hand, if he was advising Tigranes himself, he would recommend not sending assistance. Tigranes now betrayed this confidence to Mithridates, and before long, Metrodorus was dead. Plutarch notes that Tigranes did feel remorse at the whole matter, and there is no reason to think that he intended for Metrodorus to die, though one imagines that he must have realized the great peril to which he was exposing the man who had been so honest and open with him. But the biographer concludes that Mithridates already hated Metrodorus and was merely looking for an excuse to vent his distaste.11 Plutarch wryly observes that Tigranes ensured that Metrodorus had an extremely lavish funeral – sparing no cost in showing honour in death to the man he had betrayed in life. The clear impression one receives from the whole business is that the two kings deserved each other. Each arguably outdid the other in questionable – and most certainly non-Roman – behaviour (at least from Plutarch’s perspective).
Lucullus was in Ephesus when Clodius returned with the news that Tigranes was not willing to surrender Mithridates. We cannot be certain what Lucullus expected of the embassy. Did he really imagine that the Armenian monarch would hand over his father-in-law? Was he already thinking of a war in Armenia, a renewed conflict that would bring him even greater glory and inevitable comparison to the Macedonian Alexander? Was he disturbed by the news from Clodius, or secretly heartened that there was a chance to earn renown in a struggle in which he could reasonably claim that he was in the right in the quest for the king’s person and the ultimate settlement of the long and costly Mithridatic wars? The abiding problem of interpretation at this juncture in Lucullus’ life is whether or not the news from Clodius surprised him. On the whole, the evidence would seem to indicate that it did not. Lucullus could read a map as well as anyone, and he knew that Mithridates had ample land in which to be lost, and that Tigranes had a sufficiently vast empire in both territory and resources so as to be able to bargain, at the very least. It may even have occurred to Tigranes that Lucullus should have come in person for any negotiation, something that Lucullus no doubt realized in advance, and likely consciously avoided. Lucullus doubtless knew exactly the sort of man he was sending to Mithridates, too: Appius Clodius was no diplomat, and there was no real chance that he would be either impressed by or impress in turn the Armenian king.
Games and Celebration at Ephesus
While at Ephesus, Lucullus did manage to enjoy some of the customary trappings of victory and triumph. Games were now instituted in more cities of Asia in his name – additional celebrations of the Lucullea. Athletic contests and gladiatorial combats were held to mark the achievements of the commander. No doubt there was a tangible sense that the work was incomplete, despite the impressive victories that had been achieved to date. This may well have been the most enjoyable time for Lucullus in his Asian sojourn, but surely he realized even now the seriousness of the challenges he faced.
For Lucullus was soon enough made aware that Tigranes and Mithridates intended to invade Roman Asia. One can appreciate Plutarch’s note that Lucullus was in a state of incredulity as to why Tigranes had only now decided to participate in such a venture, after the defeat of Mithridates, when he could have been of arguably greater use to the Pontic king earlier.12
Plutarch notes that there were those in Rome who accused Lucullus of warmongering.13 As so often in military history, the question was of what exactly constituted resolution. For the moment, at least, Lucullus held to the line that the surrender of the king was the decisive factor in ending the war. But the question of Armenia could not be put off indefinitely. Was it to be relegated to the status of client kingdom? Was it to be absorbed into the Roman provincial structure? What sort of indemnity or punishment should be imposed on it for taking up arms against Rome? For the moment, these were questions that could more or less be left unanswered. But Lucullus’ men were apparently less than thrilled about moving deeper into what is today central and western Turkey. They were unhappy at the prospect of a new war in unfamiliar territory and difficult terrain. It was the spring of 69 BC, and Lucullus once again had the task before him of assuaging the rebellious sentiments of his men.14
There is an interesting note in the fragments of Sallust’s histories that when Pompey returned from the prosecution of the Sertorian War in 71 BC, he was considered to be willing to ingratiate himself with the plebeians.15 It is possible that some of the political manoeuvring in Rome centred on the idea that Lucullus was indeed an optimate, traditionalist, Sullan politician, and his rival Pompey – now back from his long war – was willing to take up the opposite cause. The Sullan constitution, and the bad feelings that had arisen in the wake of its violent establishment, was in some sense the political prize that was being fought for in the manoeuvrings and machinations in Roman governmental life. Lucullus was increasingly easy to stereotype a
s the traditionalist embodiment of the old ways. If there were a new path forward, it would be the Pompeian one – at least for this hour.
Crossing the Euphrates
It was still winter, early in 69 BC. Lucullus reached the Euphrates, the dividing line between Cappadocia and Armenia.16 Plutarch records the tradition that when the Romans arrived at the river, it was swollen from winter storms, such that a crossing seemed quite difficult – but by evening, the waters had subsided, and various islands in the channel became visible, such that the locals began to make homage to Lucullus, noting that the mighty Euphrates had voluntarily yielded to the great conqueror. Upon crossing, a heifer that was sacred to Artemis is said to have willingly presented itself to Lucullus for sacrifice to the goddess. The religiously dutiful Roman also sacrificed a bull to the Euphrates – bulls were the usual sacred animal for river gods, who were traditionally depicted as horned.17 The local population in general is said to have received Lucullus warmly. They were in no real position to resist him, and at any rate his reputation for just and calm dealings with native peoples made it easy to acquiesce to his moderate wishes. These were more signs of great favour for the Roman conqueror. The Euphrates was one of the traditional markers of the distant East for Rome, a river associated with Persia and the conquests of Alexander, a legendary place of fame and fortune, as well as the failure of dreams and fond aspirations. We are told that Lucullus turned over the fortress of Tomisa to the king of Cappadocia – at the very least, the king was to stay out of Lucullus’ way as he proceeded through the region. Lucullus made a lightning advance through the vast tracts of Cappadocian territory – he had his quarry to consider.18