Lucullus Page 8

  The late and notoriously problematic source the De Viris Illustribus (74) gives us another fragment of information about this period. Lucullus may have turned down Sardinia, but he did go to serve as governor in Africa once his praetorship was concluded. All we know about his conduct in Africa is that he performed his work ably and justly: Africam iustissime rexit. A superlative description for an apparently exceptional governor and administrator. Africa may have been a quite peaceful province, and no real challenge for the talents of a man who had already courted danger and seen action in the East. What is less clear is how exactly it came about that Lucullus was assigned to Africa, and agreed to go. Why did he refuse Sardinia (if we can believe Dio), but proceed to Africa? We have no conclusive answers to these questions. It may be significant that Plutarch essentially passes over the period from 78–74 BC, offering nothing in the way of summary even about Lucullus’ career.13 Despite his successes, he may have been viewed as something of a mediocrity (especially by his rivals), a loyal enough Sullan, to be sure, but perhaps not quite deserving of the signal honour that Sulla had bestowed on him by making him the legal guardian of his children. He was certainly not as ambitious a figure as the younger Pompey (or even the still younger Caesar). But by c. 70 BC, while Lucullus was still an ardent Sullan, Pompey had certainly distanced himself from the controversial legacy. Indeed, through the course of his life, Lucullus would prove remarkably steadfast in his views. While Pompey, Caesar and even Crassus seemed willing to conform to the spirit of the age, Lucullus would increasingly seem to be a throwback to an earlier time – perhaps to a time that existed only in the idealized, mythic memory of optimate traditionalists.

  Africa Proconsularis

  The Roman province of Africa was a proconsular province that had been established after the defeat of Carthage in the Third Punic War (146 BC). Vast in size, it stretched across parts of modern Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. It was a wealthy province, of great natural and human resources; Pompey had been governor there before Lucullus (82–79 BC). Africa was an especially popular province for retired veterans, who flocked to the territory to take possession of tracts of farmland that were part of the Roman military pension programme. If there is any answer to the question of why Lucullus preferred Africa to Sardinia, it may rest with the wealth of the province, and possibly with increased cultural opportunities.

  Whatever his rationale for rejecting Sardinia, Lucullus did serve in Africa, and if he discharged his responsibilities with justice and upright conduct, he also appears to have done nothing of note – indeed, there may have been nothing noteworthy for him to accomplish. We cannot be sure, even, of how long Lucullus was in Africa. At the very least he served there in 77 BC. We next hear of him as consul in 74; if he returned to Rome in 76, we are forced to conclude that he spent a considerable amount of time essentially doing nothing of historical significance before attaining the highest office of the cursus honorum. Some would thus prefer to imagine that he spent more than a year in Africa, perhaps returning to Rome in 75 BC to run for office. Some have concluded that there likely is a gap in Lucullus’ career, and one that can even be considered circumstantial evidence that he was not particularly ambitious or aggressive in his political pursuits – but this seems to be a hasty conclusion based on the tradition of Lucullus’ later descent into indolence and luxury.

  We do well to remember how uncertain we really are about various dates in Lucullus’ career, and where exactly he was at a given moment of crisis. It is quite possible that the reason for Lucullus’ apparent lack of involvement in certain major episodes in republican history was his absence from Rome at the time when positions were being canvassed and assigned. One might even dare to say that Lucullus spent both too much and too little time in Rome; certainly he knew his greatest successes and fulfillment away from the capital. Then again, his most productive years were some of the most difficult in the life of the city. Lucullus had served in the East, and now he had ruled wisely in one of the most important of the western provinces – even if it was also one of the relatively sleepier corners of the increasingly imperial republic. Still, the admittedly younger Pompey had served there too – there was no discredit in Lucullus’ tenure in Africa Proconsularis, either in the assignment or in the execution of his commission. But of course it may well be true that Lucullus had interests in other positions, and that Africa was not high on his list of desired posts. We have no way to know for certain.

  Nuptials

  We may with confidence date Lucullus’ marriage to this period as well. His bride was Clodia Pulcher, the daughter of the patrician Appius Claudius Pulcher (who died in 76 BC; the girl’s brother gave permission for the marriage) and sister of the notorious Publius Clodius Pulcher.14 We may glean some information about the nuptial union from Plutarch. Lucullus’ wife was apparently of ill repute, and her husband would eventually divorce her. If she had a positive quality, it was said to have been her appearance and not much else.15 There was even a report of incest between the wife and her brother.16 Once again there is something of an orderly, even mundane progress to our subject’s career, for despite his acknowledged talents and signal accomplishments, the steps taken toward the consulship were fairly routine. A marriage union was expected, and sometime after his return to Rome from Africa, Lucullus contracted it. In hindsight, Lucullus would rue the union; the Clodii/Claudii were a problematic lot, to be sure (the most famous members of the family, after all, were Lucullus’ ill-fated, aforementioned brother-in-law Publius Clodius Pulcher, and his sister-in-law, who has been associated with the ‘Lesbia’ of the poetry of Catullus).17 If Lucullus were known for his praiseworthy conduct and restraint, he certainly did not marry into a family of equal reputation. He would eventually divorce Clodia and marry again – although as we shall see, his second marriage would not be much better.

  The most obvious advantage to Lucullus of the marriage was that the optimate plebeian had now entered into a patrician marriage alliance; the plebeian was now closer to the traditional haunts of power, and had a certain respectability added to his relatively humble origins. Some scholars have argued that like not a few patrician families in the late Republic, the Clodii/Claudii were in difficult financial circumstances, money problems that an alliance with Lucullus might have helped to soothe. We cannot be certain. We do know that Lucullus was willing not to accept the customary dowry for the hand of Clodia, but the reason for his generosity is unclear.18 He may well have been smitten with the beautiful Clodia. If so, the day would come when he would sorely regret the infatuation. A Roman optimate was expected to marry, and to marry with an eye to political and financial gain. Whether besotted or misled, Lucullus certainly could have done better in the signing of his marriage contract.

  Consul

  The height of the cursus honorum was the consulate. Lucullus served as consul with Marcus Aurelius Cotta, the half-brother of Aurelia Cotta, the mother of Julius Caesar. In 74 BC, the situation in the increasingly imperial Roman Republic was markedly unstable. In some regards the world was a significantly more dangerous place than when Lucullus had departed for the East in the days of the First Mithridatic War. Now there was the threat of renewed war in the East with Mithridates. There were the perennially problematic Cilician pirates. And in Spain, Quintus Sertorius had waged a bitter campaign against Sulla’s optimates that had stretched on for years with no sign of resolution.19 Pompey had been earning fame and renown in the Spanish campaigns, but the situation was far from concluded – and so Rome faced threats in both the distant east and the west. Lucullus’ provincial allotment was Cisalpine Gaul, ‘Gaul on this side of the Alps’ – the part of ‘northern Italy’ made famous in later years for its Rubicon border that Caesar would cross. Cisalpine Gaul was arguably the key province in the defence of Italy from any Spanish threat. If Sertorius was to mount an attack on Italy, Rome would need a strong defensive force in Hither Gaul. For the moment, though, there was no potential for real excitement and glory in the province, and
Lucullus might well have thought the job was nothing in comparison to what Pompey could hope to achieve in Spain. We are told by Plutarch that Lucullus was quite worried that Pompey would eventually be awarded the command of the Roman forces that were increasingly inevitably seen as soon to engage Mithridates. In an ideal situation for Pompey, he would achieve victory over Sertorius in the western theatre and then proceed to vanquish the problem king in the East – and this is in fact exactly what would happen. The Lucullan nightmare of 74 BC would come true in but a few years, precious years in which Lucullus would have the opportunity to solve Rome’s eastern problems for good and all.20

  Unsurprisingly, when Pompey appealed to Rome for help in the struggle against Sertorius, Lucullus was adamant that he should be supported. The apparent fear was that Pompey would carry out his threat of returning to Italy unless he were properly funded and supplied for military operations in Spain. Lucullus was of a mind to do all he could to keep Pompey engaged with Sertorius. It is not clear if there was any definitive plan beyond this (e.g., what course of action should be followed if Pompey won a great victory and then returned in triumph). If anything, in 74 BC Lucullus must have seemed able and competent as an administrator, and less than impressive in terms of his résumé of military achievement – at least in comparison to Pompey. Plutarch notes that Marcus Cotta argued that the war with Mithridates had never really ended. The fledgling administration of Lucullus and his colleague was truly caught between two potentially massive external threats, with serious resultant implications for the political situation in Rome so soon after the Sullan-Marian civil war.21 The Republic was not functioning in the manner for which it was designed – there were too many potential military commanders jockeying for supreme power in this or that theatre. And the rise of a professional army had spelled out its own consequences for Rome.

  A Plea from Pompey

  Pompey’s appeal to Rome for help is cited in one of the more substantial surviving fragments of Book 2 of Sallust’s Historiae.22 Sallust notes that both Lucullus and Cotta were greatly distressed by Pompey’s letter, partly because of the seriousness of the situation in Spain, but also because of the fear that neither man would be able to achieve anything great if Pompey was to return to Rome. They therefore moved quickly to ensure that Pompey received whatever he needed, and in this they were supported by the nobles (nobilitas). In some sense, Lucullus’ career abroad would be spent waiting for Pompey and trying to keep Pompey at bay; the younger man would eventually arrive in Asia as none other than Lucullus’ replacement in command.

  This is the period when we first learn from Plutarch of Lucullus’ resentment and bitterness. He was concerned about his own career and advancement, especially after his posting in Gaul. Lucullus was not without enemies in Rome in this period; Plutarch notes the senator Publius Cornelius Cethegus, a notoriously decadent, hedonistic former Marian whose way of life was a source of revulsion and disgust for Lucullus.23 Lucullus openly confronted Cethegus, and the two were in a state of public estrangement and conflict. Sulla’s premature, unexpected death had left a void of incalculable consequence in Roman public affairs. If the honour he had shown to Lucullus in his last will and testament was not only a token of esteem, but also an expression of the desire that Lucullus should succeed him in at least the political arena, then much was expected of the relatively young optimate in the present difficult circumstances.24 Looming over all was the unresolved problem of Mithridates and the ultimate settlement of Roman affairs in the East. Both Pompey and Lucullus had their eyes on the great opportunities for political, military and economic glory that loomed in the realms of Asia.

  Human nature being what it is, one might hesitate before thinking that Lucullus was motivated by concern for the health of the Republic in his wish to help Pompey. Certainly this would be the cynical, not to say realistic view. We can trust the reasonable enough assessment of Sallust that Lucullus was concerned about what the return of Pompey would mean for him (less likely is that he felt that Pompey would be a threat to republican government, though this is of course possible). Lucullus and his friends no doubt wanted Pompey to stay in Spain for some time. And stay he would, in large part thanks to the work of the consul Lucullus. But he could not be kept in Hispania indefinitely.

  There is also the question of whether Lucullus was worried that if Pompey should fail in Spain, then Sertorius really would march against Italy, and he would need to take up his planned appointment in Cisalpine Gaul to guard against the Sertorian rebels.25 This consideration carries with it several problems and assumptions. Was Sertorius really in a position to aspire to march into Italy? Quite possibly. Was Lucullus likely to have viewed an appointment against Sertorius as less desirable than an Asian assignment? Also quite possibly. But would Pompey have been viewed as militarily and politically finished if he returned to Italy, having been refused in his request for monetary and resource help against Sertorius? This is more problematic, one might argue, to conclude. It would have been very difficult to attack Pompey for the Sertorian mess, were indifferent senators to refuse a legitimate request for aid in prosecuting the war.

  Whatever the exact reasoning, Lucullus wanted Pompey in Spain. And that is exactly what as consul he would achieve.26

  Cyrene

  We should also mention here that there has been some speculation that Lucullus consularis was a key player in the decision to make Cyrene a Roman province.27 The matter is problematic in the absence of evidence, but Lucullus did have experience in the region, and Rome certainly was in need of stable additions to the imperial larder. It was a competent consulship, to be sure, neither spectacular nor particularly memorable in terms of achievement. An unremittingly negative appraisal might call it mediocre. But Lucullus was no mere server of time in office. In a difficult age, some might call it enough to have maintained both relative peace at home and much of the programme and wishes of his political mentor Sulla. Cyrene was likely made a province in 74 BC (possibly in 75). Lucullus was something of an expert on the place, having stayed there for some time on his embassy for Sulla. Cyrene was a rich place in both natural resources and especially food stuffs; in a Roman world at war, Cyrene was arguably a very nice addition to the roster of provinces. But again, we do well to remember that we lack solid evidence about the process and chronology by which Cyrene was reduced to provincial status.

  Without question, Lucullus continued throughout his career and life to exhibit the virtue of pietas that had marked and distinguished his earliest public career. His father had perhaps not been terribly deserving of loyalty. Certainly one could be forgiven for questioning aspects of the Sullan settlement. But no one could claim that Lucullus was not loyal, both to birth father and de facto spiritual father. Lucullus did not falter in his resolve; he was not inconsistent in his positions. It is for this reason above all that he might well deserve the title of last of the republicans. Did Lucullus discern a threat to the Republic in the attitude of Pompey? If so, he certainly foresaw it in Caesar. There was likely no question that a man of Lucullus’ pedigree would stand for and win the consulship. What remained to be seen was what he did with his term of office, and what foreign service would follow it.

  Mithridates and Sertorius

  Rome, meanwhile, was faced the real threat of war on two fronts, and it did not help that in 78 BC, Mithridates had made the perhaps obvious decision to seek an alliance with Sertorius in Spain.28 Sertorius was willing to negotiate – at least, this was his public position – on the condition that he would receive significant territorial concessions in the East. Sertorius was a master diplomat as well as a capable military tactician and strategist. He was more than willing to engage in diplomatic overtures and communications with Mithridates, the Cilician pirates and even, eventually, the slaves under Spartacus in Italy. And he would come quite close to achieving a goal of erecting an independent Roman Republic in Hispania. Again, we do well to remember that anyone with a map could see the advantages to Sertorius and Mithrid
ates joining forces – or at least agreeing to pursue a common policy.29

  And, needless to say, Mithridates spent his time carefully mustering more forces and renewed materials for war; he knew as well as anyone that a future conflict with Rome was inevitable. If Mithridates and Sertorius needed to communicate, pirate ships were an easy and abundant source of diplomatic conveyance, for the Cilician bandits and other marauders of the sea were more than happy to ally with both against the Republic. No doubt the death of Sulla played its own part in the unfolding of international affairs; Mithridates may have felt that the time was right to strike in the aftermath of the demise of the great general who had chased him out of Greece. Indeed, if we can believe Appian’s account, the death of Sulla was the major reason why the senate did not admit emissaries from Mithridates, who had come in 78 BC in the hope of ratifying the Peace of Dardanus.30 They were simply too busy, it seems, with domestic affairs. No doubt Mithridates’ representatives were incensed at the lukewarm reception. Scholars continue to debate why exactly the Romans were so curt and dismissive of the king’s emissaries. It is no great surprise that Mithridates would have sought the company of Sertorius after such a rebuff – though we should be hesitant to accept the idea that the king had sincerely sought to ratify a lasting peace with Rome. The aftermath of the First Mithridatic War was simply a classic case of the problem of leaving a war unfinished. There was no serious agreement between Rome and Pontus as to where the line should be drawn between their respective spheres of influence. Appian is blunt: the preparations for what would be the Third Mithridatic War were soon fully underway, and the war would cost the king his empire and Sertorius his life.31